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ABSTRACT. Recently a new battle has emerged that implicates law, 
science and religion. The battle has focused on intelligent design (ID) and 
the numerous legal, philosophical, and educational concerns surrounding it. 
In the United States, resolution of these concerns centers on two questions: 
Is lD science? And is lD religion? Despite the fact that lD does not meet the 
standards of scientific rigor, ID proponents have been able to create a 
remarkably well-designed marketing plan aimed at imposing a theistic 
naturalism in schools and scientific discourse in the U.S. and a growing 
number of other countries. Both the ID movement and some of its most 
vociferous opponents have a vested interest in suggesting that science, 
especially evolutionary biology, and religion are incompatible and that law 
should recognize this supposed incompatibility. This paper presents a 
philosophical and legal counterpoint. 
Keywords: intelligent design, law, religion, science, education 
1. Introduction 
In the United States a battle rages everyday over where humanity 
came from, or more specifically how humans came to be human. 
Much of the debate is focused on whether a supposedly new concept 
of human origins-Intelligent Design-should be taught in public 
schools. Intelligent Design advocates have brought this battle beyond 
U.S. borders and the issue has come up, or will soon come up, in 
numerous other countries. Eastern Europe has been a particularly 
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strong target for this growing movement and for the Creation 
Science movement before it. Yet few people know much if anything 
about this "new" concept, how it came to the fore, that it is actually 
based on religious rather than scientific arguments, and what it 
means for law, faith and the future of science. 
Intelligent design advocates have a vested interest in this 
confusion. Intelligent design (ID) is in part a response to several 
important cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 1 
Confusion regarding the history and nature of ID has the potential-
so far unrealized-to serve its advocates well in future legal battles 
in the United States. ID is, in part, a savvy marketing response to 
repeated legal defeats for creationism and "creation science" in 
American public schools. In some other countries there are no such 
constitutional barriers to the teaching of Intelligent Design and it 
must be hoped that educators and scientists in these countries are 
able to keep ID from being taught as science, for as will be explained, 
it is not science, at least as that term is understood by scientists today; 
and most assuredly ID advocates want it taught as science wherever 
possible. 
If ID advocates simply proposed their ideas in a philosophical or 
theological context-ideas that are already thousands of years old in 
those disciplines-there would be little dispute. After all, in a free 
society there is nothing wrong with believing in design. Freedom of 
religion is an important touchstone for any free society. The problem 
arises when ID enters the ''proof game" in the scientific context-i.e., 
attempts to claim the mantle of science. The movement has a vested 
interest in doing this so that it can market its ideas in science 
classrooms/ but to do so legitimately and without violating the U.S. 
Constitution ID must not be religion and should be science, and thus 
the proof game is everything to ID proponents.3 
By couching ID as science and not theology ID proponents are 
able to argue for access to the forum of scientific debate. As will be 
seen, they often treat the scientific realm as a limited public forum 
for debate of "scientific" theories.4 They then claim ID is being 
discriminated against when it is excluded from that forum.5 These 
claims rely on free speech concepts such as viewpoint discrimination 
and content discrimination, often cast by ID proponents in broad 
terms like "academic freedom" and "fairness."6 These arguments are, 
however, question begging. If ID is a scientific theory it might have 
a place in scientific discourse, but if not such claims will fail. 
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Otherwise, alchemy could claim a place in chemistry classrooms, 
astrology in astronomy classes and UFO logy in a number of fields. 
Moreover, public school classrooms (primary and secondary) have 
never been viewed as forums for unlimited speech under the First 
Amendment in the United States. 
In order to justify including intelligent design in scientific 
courses under current U.S. legal standards the ID movement needs to 
redefine science.7 In a recent landmark case regarding intelligent 
design in the public schools, a biologist who is also a leading 
proponent of ID acknowledged under intense questioning that a 
definition of science that would include intelligent design would also 
include astrology.8 In all fairness to this biologist, he had no choice 
because as will be explained later in this article there is no way 
around this conundrum when one tries to include ID within the 
defmition of science. 
2. Some (Very) Basic Background on Intelligent Design 
In Creationism's Trojan Horse: The Wedge of Intelligent Design,9 
Professor Barbara Forrest and Paul R. Gross painstakingly document 
the history of the ID movement. In that book they note that ID was 
designed, in part, as a strategy to get around the numerous legal 
defeats that both creationism and creation science endured. 10 In fact, 
however, this link may be even greater than Forrest and Gross argue. 
Early ID supporters read the language in United States Supreme 
Court cases like Edwards v. Aguillard11 and Epperson v. Arkansas, 12 
and realized they had to take God out of their theory in order to get 
ID into American public schools and into scientific discourse more 
generally. 13 They also realized they would need to do work that 
could at least plausibly be called science and that they would need to 
gain acceptance for this work at least in the public's eye. 14 
Among the originators of the ID movement are two law professors, 
Phillip Johnson and David K. DeWolf. 15 One might expect that 
biologists would be the primary originators of what is claimed to be 
an alternative scientific theory to evolution, but when one looks at 
the early proponents of ID there were more philosophers, law 
professors and social scientists than natural scientists, a number of 
the natural scientists were not biologists, and none of the biologists 
was an evolutionary biologist. 16 
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In fact, it was Phillip Johnson, a law professor, who spurred the 
movement with the 1991 publication of his book, Darwin on Trial. 17 
Interestingly, the book starts out by discussing Edwards v. Aguillard.18 
From there Johnson moves into an attack on what many ID advocates 
refer to as "scientific materialism," which he defmed as attempts "to 
explain all human behavior as the subrational product of unbending 
chemical, genetic, or environmental forces." 19 His ultimate assault in 
the book is on Darwinian science,20 and this remains true of ID 
today?1 
Much of the basis for ID appears to be a view of the world which 
promotes the notion there are absolute moral principles that humans 
should abide by and are meant to abide by,22 that Darwinian science 
removes the basis for such principles by treating human existence as 
a series of unguided biological accidents (their characterization, not a 
necessary or even accurate one), 23 and that Darwinianism promotes 
scientific and natural materialism; that is, the view that natural forces 
are responsible for everything.24 However, a key strategic advantage 
(at least for purposes of U.S. constitutional law) ofiD over its more 
openly creationist predecessors is that it does not acknowledge that 
the Intelligent Designer is G-d. 
As will be seen, the roots of ID are in Christian Apologetics and 
natural theology, so attempts to deny that the designer is divine seem 
to be a response to the language in Edwards v. Aguillard, discussed 
below, prohibiting the teaching of religious theories that are not 
falsifiable as science. It is an attempt at shielding ID from legal 
attacks under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.25 
There are two overarching components to ID. First, exploiting 
supposed gaps in evolutionary biology and attacking evolutionary 
biology generally?6 Second, trying to demonstrate the designer through 
the complexity of living organisms. 27 The end goal of both of these 
tactics is to overthrow scientific materialism and what ID proponents 
call "naturalism."28 Naturalism, according to ID proponents, is the 
idea that natural forces explain what we see in the world and in 
living organisms, and that the world and the organisms in it came 
about through purely natural (i.e. no higher power) mechanisms.29 
Interestingly, this is a straw man argument. One can accept 
naturalism and the mechanisms said to support it without denying a 
higher power. In fact famed biologist Kenneth Miller wrote 
extensively about this in Finding Darwin's God.30 It is only because 
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ID proponents enter the scientific proof game that their straw man 
takes on life. There are many people of faith who accept what ID 
proponents call "methodological naturalism,"31 which is just a fancy 
term for the idea that natural processes have given rise to much of 
what we see in the world around us. Naturalism is not inherently 
inconsistent with faith, nor does it preclude the theological notion of 
God as designer.32 For people of faith who accept scientific evidence, 
naturalism may simply suggest that the natural mechanisms observed 
and documented by scientists are the work of God. 33 The latter point, 
of course, being beyond scientific proof. This is not a problem until 
one: A. assumes that naturalism somehow must conflict with faith; 
and B. that science is the appropriate arena in which to try to prove 
the existence of the supernatural/divine. ID assumes both these 
things.34 
In 1802, Reverend William Paley published his famous, Natural 
Theology.35 In this book Paley discusses the concept of the watchmaker 
God. 36 His book was part of an important and broader movement 
particularly popular in the 17th and 18th centuries, which looked to 
relate the natural world and religion.37 Paley, like other theological 
naturalists, studied the natural world quite seriously and through the 
lens of how the natural world reflects the divinity of God. 38 Paley's 
watchmaker analogy can be restated roughly as follows: a person 
walking through a park comes upon a stone on the ground and in it 
may see the natural world at work without regard to design. That 
same person walks through the park again and comes upon a watch. 
The person upon observing the watch is likely to recognize that the 
watch must have been designed by an intelligent creator, and thus the 
analogy proceeds to equate complex natural phenomena to the watch 
and the watchmaker to an intelligent (and divine) creator.39 Even in 
Reverend Paley's time this reasoning was not new. The idea goes at 
least as far back as Plato's famous dialogue, the Timaeus.40 Analogues 
can be found in the Roman philosopher Cicero's De Natura Deorum 
(On the Nature of the Gods)41 and in Thomas Aquinas' Summa 
Theologica. 42 
Of course Paley, unlike many ID proponents, did not claim the 
concept was new, nor did he attempt to hide its connection to the 
divine. Reverend Paley was unabashedly a Christian Apologist.43 For 
those unfamiliar with the concept, Christian Apologetics involves 
attempting to prove the truth of Christian teachings.44 Paley had no 
reason to hide this, and in fact his work, when viewed as a work of 
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Christian Apologetics and natural theology, was impressive for its 
time.45 But that, of course, is the point. Reverend Paley would not 
deny that the designer (watchmaker) is God, and he would not deny 
that natural theology is theology. 
The point is that the watchmaker (ID) argument was not even 
new in the early Nineteenth century although Reverend Paley's 
explication of it was quite advanced for its time. Yet, ID proponents 
claim to have developed "new" theories such as "irreducible 
complexity" and "specified complexity," which bare a remarkable 
resemblance to natural theology and creationist arguments.46 All the 
ID proponents have done is repackage these old ideas without 
explicit reference to the divine and sprinkle in some fancy terminology 
that makes it all sound more scientific.47 Detailed discussion of these 
ideas are beyond the scope of this article. For an in depth discussion 
of these concepts, and the scientific, philosophical, religious and 
legal implications of them, as well as the ID movements' attack on 
evolution through natural selection, see Frank S. Ravitch, Marketing 
Intelligent Design: Law and the Creationist Agenda (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2011). 
What this means from a constitutional perspective in the United 
States is that ID is a religious theory and it can not be taught in 
public school sciences classes. This conclusion is further backed by 
the fact that ID is not accepted as science by mainstream scientists 
(the abovementioned book explains this in greater detail) and that a 
leading ID proponent admitted on the witness stand that science 
would need to be redefined to include ID and that such a defmition 
would include astrology. In the United States, at least, ID may be 
taught in philosophy or comparative religion classes so long as it is 
not taught as scientific or religious truth. 
3. ID and the United States Constitution 
In Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,48 a federal district court 
held that the inclusion of a disclaimer favoring ID in classrooms, the 
purchase and placement ofiD texts in the school library, and conduct 
by some school board members violated the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment.49 The key issue in the case was whether ID is 
religion or science. 5° This issue was so important because if ID is a 
religiously grounded concept including it in science classrooms, even 
through a mandatory disclaimer, would violate the Establishment 
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Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 51 If 
ID is science, however, there might be an argument it could be 
included in such classes despite its religious underpinnings. If ID is 
neither religion nor science there is no constitutional issue because if 
it is not religious the Establishment Clause could not be violated;52 
although teaching ID as science would still raise serious educational 
concerns that could be addressed at the state level. 
The court heard testimony from leading philosophers of science, 53 
biologists,54 and ID proponents.55 After hearing all this testimony 
and evaluating documentary evidence such as manuscripts of an ID 
textbook that was virtually identical to a creation science text with 
"intelligent designer" substituted for G-d and "intelligent design" for 
"creation," the court held that ID is not science and that it is a 
religiously grounded theory.56 The court's holding that ID is a 
religiously based theory and not a scientific theory was central to its 
reasoning under the Establishment Clause. 57 The Supreme Court had 
already held in Edwards v. Aguillard, 58 that religiously based theories of 
creation (in that case "creation science") could not be taught in public 
school science classes without running afoul of the Establishment 
Clause. 59 Once the Kitzmiller court determined that ID is not science, 
and that it is religion, the outcome that the school board policies 
violated the Establishment Clause was unavoidable.60 
The court applied two legal tests that had been used by the 
United States Supreme Court in earlier Establishment Clause cases, 
including the cases dealing with Creationism and Creation Science: 
the Endorsement test and the Lemon test.61 The Lemon test has three 
prongs. First, government must have a secular purpose for whatever 
actions/laws are being questioned.62 Second, the primary effect of the 
law or other government action must neither advance nor inhibit 
religion.63 The third element of the Lemon test is that there can not 
be excessive entanglement between government and religion.64 
Traditionally, this element has had two facets. First, what is known 
as institutional entanglement--concern over government meddling 
with or overseeing religion, or government and religious entities 
becoming too intertwined institutionally.65 The second facet is 
divisiveness entanglement, which occurs when government support 
of, or interaction with, religion or religious entities creates divisiveness 
in the community along religious lines.66 This latter facet has been 
eliminated from the test in the aid and funding context, but appears 
to still apply in other contexts.67 The Lemon test is an "or" test, 
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meaning that if any of the three elements are violated the law or 
government action is unconstitutional. 68 
The Endorsement Test was first introduced by Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,69 a 
case upholding the display of a nativity scene by the city of 
Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Justice O'Connor wrote: 
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from 
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a 
person's standing in the political community .... Endor+ 
sement sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, 
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders, favored members of the political community. 
Disapproval sends the opposite message. 
*** 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether 
governmentj:s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove 
of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective 
of government's actual purpose, the practice under review 
in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. 
An affirmative answer to either question should render 
the challenged practice invalid. 
*** 
Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or 
disapproval of religion makes clear that the effect prong 
of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require 
invalidation of a government practice merely because it 
in fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or 
inhibition of religion. 
*** 
What is crucial is that a government practice does not 
have the effect of communicating a message of govern-
ment endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only 
practices having that effect, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or 
public perception, to status in the political community. 
Justice O'Connor characterized the endorsement test as a clarification 
of the first two prongs of the Lemon test, and the Court sometimes 
treats it as such today.70 The Court has also referred to the endor-
sement test as a separate test, and many lower courts treat it as such 
even though the analysis overlaps. The perspective from which courts 
are to determine whether a given government activity endorses religion 
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is that of the reasonable observer. 71 The reasonable observer is 
presumed to be aware of the relevant history and context of the 
government action in question. 72 The context can be physical as in 
the case of religious displays and also vocal-i.e. focusing on the 
message being sent by the government action. Whether or not a 
government action endorses religion is determined by assessing 
whether a reasonable observer acquainted with the history and 
context of the government action would perceive that government is 
created political insiders and outsiders along religious lines.73 
In Kitzmiller, the court held that the school board policy and 
related actions (such as the acquisition of ID textbooks for the school 
library) violated the endorsement tese4 and the purpose and effects 
prongs of the Lemon test, 75 and thus it violated the Establishment 
Clause. 76 This is so because the court found that ID is not science 
and that there was overwhelming evidence proving that ID is 
religiously grounded.77 The evidence demonstrated that the purpose 
of implementing the ID policy was to endorse the majority school 
board members' religious views/8 and that there is no secular 
purpose that would support teaching ID as science.79 Therefore, the 
policy would make a reasonable observer familiar with the history of 
the policy feel that the board was creating political and religious 
insiders and outsiders based on religious views.80 
The board argued that the purpose of the policy was to promote 
critical thinking skills and improve science education.81 Certainly 
exposure to different ideas and values might support teaching ID in 
comparative religion or philosophy classes, 82 but because the court 
held ID is not a scientific theory there is no secular purpose for 
teaching it in science classes. 83 The board fared no better when the 
court analyzed the effects of the policy under the endorsement test. 
The court held that because ID is religious and not science the effect 
of the disclaimer and book purchases was to endorse religion.84 Thus, 
when the policy was implemented, the disclaimer was read in classes, 
and ID books were added to the library in a well advertised manner, 
a reasonable observer would believe that such actions had the effect 
of creating political and religious insiders and outsiders. 85 There was 
substantial evidence to back up the notion that indeed this is exactly 
what happened in Dover when the policy was being debated and 
after it was passed and implemented.86 This same analysis essentially 
applied to the Lemon effects test as well. 87 The court used the same 
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reasoning to hold that the primary effect of the Dover School Board 
policy was to promote the religious theory of1D.88 
4. Conclusion 
The U.S. experience with ID raises numerous questions about the 
role religion can play in effecting science in constitutional democracies. 
The stakes are high. Real science has led to numerous breakthroughs 
in medicine, technology, travel, and the environment. If science is 
successfully undermined by religiously grounded theories future sci-
entific research could be effected and advances slowed. At the same 
time protecting science must not lead to the demeaning of religion or 
interference with its free exercise in areas, unlike science, where 
religion has a place. In the United States the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution poses a potentially effective barrier to this 
happening. In other countries, such as Japan and Canada, similar 
constitutional provisions may prevent it. Yet in other countries the 
barriers must be institutional rather than constitutional. It is up to 
these nations' science and educational authorities to make sure that 
religion is not used to limit science, while at the same time 
protecting robust religious freedom. This has happened in England 
and Australia where educational authorities have rejected teaching 
ID in the schools on the basis of sound educational judgement. What 
will happen elsewhere remains to be seen, but for now, the U.S. has 
the greatest experience with ID. 
NOTE 
This paper is a brief description of some of the issues addressed in Frank S. 
Ravitch, Marketing Intelligent Design: Law and the Creationist Agenda 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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